CIT Sustains Inclusion of Canvas Banner Matisse in Scope of AD Order on Artist Canvas

The Court of International Trade on Oct. 8 sustained the Commerce Department's scope ruling including importer Printing Textiles' "Canvas Banner Matisse" imports within the scope of the antidumping duty order on artist canvas from China. Judge Timothy Stanceu said Commerce's interpretation of one sentence of the order's scope that is ambiguous "was not per se unreasonable."

The judge rejected a host of claims from Printing Textiles, finding that Commerce didn't fail to consider, or misapply, the (k)(1) factors, such as the original AD petition, prior scope rulings and other primary sources, in the ruling, and that the final scope ruling was supported by adequate evidence.

Stanceu also disagreed with the importer's claim that the AD order is unconstitutionally vague, creating a due process violation in failing to notify the company that its goods were subject to the order. The court said the lone ambiguous sentence in the scope, when read in the context of the entire scope, "is insufficient to render the entire scope language unconstitutionally vague." While the sentence could have been more precisely written, the entire scope language "is sufficiently detailed and descriptive that anyone importing Canvas Banner Matisse" was on notice that the product could reasonably fit under the AD order's scope, the court said.

The AD order covers artist canvases, generally described as "tightly woven prepared painting and/or printing services." The court said by saying the term covers products in various forms, the order indicates that it's "intended to have a broad meaning." Looking at the scope language, Stanceu said the following sentence is ambiguous: "Priming/coating includes the application of a solution, designed to promote the adherence of artist materials, such as paint or ink, to the fabric."

The court said the word "includes" is ambiguous as to whether "priming/coating" must be designed to "promote the adherence of artist materials for a canvas to be included" in the order. The use of this word "makes it uncertain whether the sentence is intended as a definition of the term 'primed/coated' as used in the previous sentence," the decision said. The words "designed to promote the adherence of artist materials," is also "susceptible to varied interpretations," the court said.

Printing Textiles argued for a narrow interpretation of the words "priming/coating." Commerce said it doesn't rigidly require that the priming or coating function to "promote" adherence of artist materials by increasing the adherence beyond the level of untreated material. The agency said it was enough that the priming or coating applied to the canvas banner "imparted characteristics to the fabric that brought it within" the scope language. Stanceu said the importer failed to show that the "stiffening, whitening, and opacity do not relate to the use of the product as a surface designed for, and suitable for, the printing of images using paint or ink."

The court also rejected Printing Textiles' claim that Commerce misapplied or failed to consider the (k)(1) sources in interpreting the ambiguous statement in the scope language. In its decision, the agency referred to two (k)(1) sources: the ITC report from the AD investigation and its own prior scope rulings. Stanceu held that Commerce wasn't required by its regulations to "consider all (k)(1) sources specified in the regulation."

The importer said Commerce should have considered the petition, which said artist canvas is made by coating raw canvas with "a specific coating formula." Printing Textiles said that because its product uses a different formula, its goods should be excluded from the order. Stanceu said the scope language doesn't impose a requirement that a specific coating formula be used, adopting a broader scope than advocated for by the importer based on one page of the petition.

The judge added that the scope ruling was based on substantial evidence, noting that Commerce cited various disclosures in the scope ruling application. The importer failed to "confront the significance of the evidence in its own Scope Ruling Application" that its products are "suitable for use" and are used as a canvas "to which printed images, including 'art reproduction,' are applied." The record also has sufficient evidence that the canvas banner Matisse is primed and coated in a way that contributes to the characteristics of the product by allowing it to be used as artist canvas.

George Thompson, counsel for petitioner Ecker Textiles, said in an email that the "Court reached the correct outcome. That the product in question falls squarely under the Antidumping Duty Order's scope description was never in doubt, as the plaintiff's own materials identified it as printing canvas. The Court also properly rejected the argument that the scope language cannot be enforced for vagueness. Instead, the decision properly recognizes that the plaintiff's canvas was coated for printing and meets the clear definition of Artist Canvas set forth in the Order."

(Printing Textiles, d/b/a Berger Textiles v. U.S., Slip Op. 24-110, CIT # 23-00192, dated 10/08/24; Judge: Timothy Stanceu; Attorneys: Kyl Kirby of Kyl J. Kirby, Attorney and Counselor at Law, for plaintiff Printing Textiles; Christopher Berridge for defendant U.S. government; George Thompson of Thompson & Associates for defendant-intervenor Ecker Textiles)